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CLINICAL PRAGMATISM: JOHN DEWEY AND
CLINICAL ETHICS*
Franklin G. Miller, Ph.D.
Joseph J. Fins, M.D.
Matthew D. Bacchetta, M.B.A., M.A.
I. INTRODUCTION
Susan Wolf recently argued that bioethics is undergoing a shift in para-
digm from "principlism," which has shaped the mainstream of the field
from its inception in the late 1960's, to pragmatism. She summarizes the
main features of this paradigm shift as follows: "The turn toward empiri-
cism, rejection of theoretical elegance as the measure of good bioethics
and health law, and insistence instead on evaluating what meets the needs
of individuals in clinical settings is a diagnostically pragmatist move."'
By invoking the term "paradigm," Wolf appeals to the work of Thomas
Kuhn, who has insightfully explained scientific revolutions with respect to
dramatic changes in the theoretical paradigms that orient the various do-
mains of science.2 After the initial formulation of a new paradigm, the
chief task for "normal science" is what Kuhn calls "paradigm articula-
tion:" tracing its theoretical and experimental implications.' We en-
deavor in this essay to contribute to the articulation of the pragmatic
paradigm for bioethics through two related investigations.
First, we examine the thought of John Dewey, the classical pragmatist.
It is remarkable that Dewey's philosophy has had so little influence on
the development of bioethics. The biological foundation of his thinking
and his lifelong concern for integrating theory and practice by bringing
scientific method to bear on moral questions make Dewey's pragmatic
philosophy particularly well suited for bioethics, which operates at one of
the most significant intersections of science and ethics. The development
* We dedicate this essay to John Fletcher-our mentor, colleague, and friend-
whose creative work in bioethics manifests the spirit of clinical pragmatism.
1. Susan M. Wolf, Shifting Paradigms in Bioethics and Health Law: The Rise of a
New Pragmatism, 20 AM. J. L. & MED. 395, 411 (1994).
2. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970).
3. Id. at 23-34.
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of bioethics as a discipline during the 1970's was paralleled by a renewal
of philosophical interest in- Dewey's thought, spurred largely by the pro-
vocative work of Richard Rorty.4 Yet the theoretical dominance in
bioethics of principlism, animated by the analytical movement in Ameri-
can philosophy that supplanted pragmatism, produced an intellectual en-
vironment with no room for Dewey's approach to ethics. Recent critical
assaults on the abstracted theorizing of principlism and the identification
of pragmatic themes, such as the importance of the empirical understand-
ing of clinical contexts, pave the way for an examination of the fruitful-
ness of Dewey's philosophy as a source for reorienting bioethics.
It is particularly timely to bring Dewey's pragmatic philosophy to bear
on bioethics in light of intensifying scholarly interest in Dewey over the
past few years. Robert Westbrook, Steven Rockefeller, and Alan Ryan
each have written significant and well-executed intellectual biographies
of Dewey that approach his thought from different, but compatible, per-
spectives.' Additionally, James Campbell recently published a fine intro-
duction to the broad range of Dewey's philosophy. 6 Bioethics scholars
who wish to explore in depth the wealth of Dewey's philosophy can be
aided by these, and other, guides. One aim of this essay is to encourage
this exploration, which should enhance the development of both the the-
ory and practice of bioethics.
Second, we outline some of the major implications of Dewey's prag-
matic philosophy for the emerging subdiscipline of clinical ethics.
Clinical ethics is concerned with analyzing and resolving moral problems
that arise in the care of patients in clinical settings. In addition, clinical
ethics is, or ought to be, concerned with mapping the reform of clinical
practice in the light of appropriate moral ideals. This essay concentrates
on two themes that have particular significance for developing a prag-
matic perspective on clinical ethics. Dewey articulated a pragmatic the-
ory of inquiry in general, and ethical inquiry in particular, that we find
4. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979
2nd prtg. 1980); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982 6th prtg. 1994);
RICHARD RORTY, 1 OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
(1991). See also RORTY & PRAGMATISM: THE PHILOSOPHER RESPONDS TO HIS CRITICS
(Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. ed., 1995) (providing critical evaluations of Rorty's interpreta-
tions of Dewey with replies by Rorty).
5. See ROBERT B. WESTBROOK, JOHN DEWEY AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1991);
STEVEN C. ROCKEFELLER, JOHN DEWEY: RELIGIOUS FAITH AND DEMOCRATIC HUMAN-
ISM (1991); ALAN RYAN, JOHN DEWEY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM
(1995).
6. JAMES CAMPBELL, UNDERSTANDING JOHN DEWEY: NATURE AND COOPERATIVE
INTELLIGENCE 1-22 (1995).
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especially well suited for guiding the analysis and resolution of moral
problems in clinical practice. In addition, we see Dewey's basic social
ideal of "democracy as a way of life"'7 as an orienting perspective for the
reform of clinical practice, both with respect to the clinician-patient (or
surrogate) dyad and the various institutional dimensions of health care.
The pragmatic method of inquiry and problem-solving and the demo-
cratic model represent the two pillars of an approach to clinical ethics
that we call "clinical pragmatism."'
This essay provides an introductory overview of selected aspects of
Dewey's philosophy, emphasizing those themes that are particularly illu-
minating for bioethics. We then sketch the outlines of the pragmatic
method of ethical inquiry and the democratic model of clinical practice.
In the final section, we briefly discuss some of the major implications of
clinical pragmatism for clinical ethics.
II. SOURCES AND KEY THEMES OF DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHY
John Dewey lived from 1859 to 1952, a time of great social and intellec-
tual transformation. Dewey was the most distinguished and best known
American philosopher during the first third of the twentieth century. He
was perhaps the last of the grand philosophers who endeavored to make
significant contributions to all the major areas of philosophy-logic, the-
ory of knowledge, metaphysics, ethics, social philosophy, and aesthetics.
A full account of the historical sources of Dewey's philosophy would span
the scope of the Western philosophical tradition from the ancient Greeks
to the early years of the twentieth century. For the purposes of this brief
overview, we highlight three major sources: G.W.F. Hegel, Charles Dar-
win, and Charles Peirce.
Hegel had an enormous influence on philosophy in the latter half of
the nineteenth century in the United States and Great Britain, and
Dewey was an ardent Hegelian in his philosophical youth.9 In his ma-
ture works, Dewey rejected the metaphysics of absolute idealism and
Hegel's dialectical logic in favor of a thoroughgoing naturalistic philoso-
phy of pragmatic empiricism. In accounting for the sources and nature of
his philosophical enterprise, however, Dewey remarked that Hegel left "a
7. JOHN DEWEY, Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us, in JOHN DEWEY: THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS 240 (Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993).
8. Joseph J. Fins & Matthew D. Bacchetta, Framing the Physician-Assisted Suicide
and Voluntary Active Euthanasia Debate: The Role of Deontology, Consequentialism, and
Clinical Pragmatism, 43 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 563, 563 (1995).
9. ROCKEFELLER, supra note 5, at 19.
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permanent deposit" in his thinking.1"
Dewey's philosophy retained a Hegelian perspective on reality, as sys-
tematically interconnected and undergoing a dynamic process of develop-
ment. Like Hegel, Dewey was philosophically opposed to dualistic,
dichotomous thinking, that asserts or presumes sharp logical and onto-
logical boundaries between philosophical concepts and the aspects of re-
ality that they signify. Throughout his philosophical career, Dewey
staunchly and persistently criticized the pervasive dualism characteristic
of the Western philosophical tradition, including permanence and change,
mind and body, reason and experience, knowledge and belief, theory and
practice, and facts and values. In Art as Experience, Dewey formulated a
methodological rule that governed his philosophy: "Wherever continuity
is possible, the burden of proof rests upon those who assert opposition
and dualism."'"
In his social philosophy, Dewey espoused a communitarian version of
liberalism, which was influenced by Hegel's critique of the "atomistic in-
dividualism"' 2 presupposed by the classical liberal thinkers from Locke
to Kant. Dewey was a champion of freedom and civil liberties, but he
rejected the ideology of natural rights of individuals independent of soci-
ety and historical context. Nor did Dewey see contracts between self-
determining individuals as the moral glue of society. For Dewey, as for
Hegel, individuality was not given as a natural fact of human life; it is
created and developed through participation in social institutions.
A second seminal influence on Dewey was Charles Darwin, whose
work Origin of Species was published in 1859, the year Dewey was born.
Darwin's work, which dealt the final blow to the classical world-view in
natural science, showed that the mechanistic process of natural selection
could explain the marvelous adaptation of organisms to their environ-
ment without invoking Aristotelian teleologic causation in terms of pur-
poses governing nature. In his naturalistic approach to philosophy,
Dewey embraced the Darwinian revolution.' 3
10. JOHN DEWEY, From Absolutism to Experimentalism (1929-30), in 2 THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF JOHN DEWEY: THE STRUCTURE OF EXPERIENCE 1-13 (John J. McDermott ed.,
1973), reprinted in 5 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953 147, 154 (Jo Ann Boyd-
ston ed., 1981).
11. JOHN DEWEY, Art and Experience (1934), in 10 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER
WORKS, 1925-1953 34 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1981).
12. See STEVEN B. SMITH, HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF LIBERALISM: RIGHTS IN CONTEXT
140 (1989).
13. See JOHN DEWEY, 1 THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY: THE STRUCTURE OF Ex-
PERIENCE 31-41 (John J. McDermott ed., 1973).
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Two implications of Darwin's theory were most significant for Dewey.
First, the revolutionary idea that species of living beings evolve over time
undermined the metaphysical presumption that there exist fixed, perma-
nent natural kinds. Second, the theory of evolution focused attention on
the continuity between lower and higher animals, and thus supported a
naturalistic conception of human life and morality. Darwin's theory of-
fered Dewey a biological grounding for the Hegelian themes of develop-
ment and continuity. Dewey based his mature philosophy on a
Darwinian foundation of interaction between human organisms and their
environments. He saw the distinctively human means of adaptation as
the development and refinement of habits of intelligence, epitomized by
experimental science."
Dewey's conception of intelligence in thought and action was also in-
fluenced significantly by Charles Peirce, generally recognized as the
founder of American pragmatism. It was not until Dewey emancipated
his thinking from the metaphysical framework of Hegelian idealism that
he came to appreciate the significance of Peirce's philosophy, particularly
its implications for conceiving logic operationally as the theory of in-
quiry. 5 Peirce formulated pragmatism as a conception of the meaning of
ideas or the definition of concepts. Stated roughly, what is meant by
ascribing a property P to an object, is the effect that is observed when
operations on the object are experimentally performed. Thus, to call an
object hard means that it is unlikely to be scratched when brought into
contact with most other substances. Conceptual meaning for Peirce is
tied to experience in the context of practical, experimental action:
"There is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a
possible difference in practice."' 6
The pragmatic conception of meaning posits an integral connection be-
tween thinking, action, and experience. For both Peirce and Dewey, this
integration of theory and practice is best exemplified in the experimental
method of science. Dewey systematically developed the approach of
pragmatic experimentalism in all aspects of his mature philosophy, in-
cluding his analysis of the meaning and validation of moral judgments. 7
14. See JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY 172 (1922).
15. See generally JOHN DEWEY, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, in 12 JOHN DEWEY:
THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1986).
16. CHARLES PEIRCE, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, in PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF
PEIRCE 23-42, 30 (Justus Buchler ed., 1955).
17. See discussion infra Parts II.A, II.B.
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Dewey also incorporated into his pragmatic philosophy a doctrine that
Peirce called "fallibilism.' 8 Peirce argued that absolute certainty can
never be reached about matters of fact. He viewed fallibilism as emanat-
ing from the logic and spirit of science. The self-correcting process of
scientific inquiry overthrows previously established beliefs, accepted as
knowledge, and tentatively establishes new beliefs. Dewey applied
Peirce's fallibilism to the domain of valuation and morality. He criticized
the "quest for certainty" that dominated the classical tradition of philoso-
phy. 9 Since moral beliefs should be considered as fallible, they have the
logical status of hypotheses, not certain laws or self-evident truths.
Dewey saw profound implications for the reconstruction of ethics and so-
cial philosophy in applying the logic of experimental inquiry to moral
problems of social life.
III. DEWEY'S THEORY OF INQUIRY
The influence of Hegel, Darwin, and Peirce coalesced Dewey's mature
philosophy into an effort to integrate science and ethics through the prag-
matic or instrumental method of experimental inquiry. This abiding pro-
ject of Dewey's career is captured in an essay on his philosophical
development, aptly entitled From Absolutism to Experimentalism.
I became more and more troubled by the intellectual scandal
that seemed to me involved in the current (and traditional) du-
alism in logical standpoint and method between something
called "science" on the one hand and something called "morals"
on the other. I have long felt that the construction of a logic,
that is a method of effective inquiry, which would apply without
abrupt breach of continuity to the fields designated by both of
these words, is at once our needed theoretical solvent and the
supply of our greatest practical want.2"
In his theory of inquiry, Dewey constructed a bridge between science
and ethics. He understood inquiry-the use of intelligent thought to
solve problems-naturalistically; it emerges from, and is continuous with,
the adaptive functioning of organisms in the context of their environ-
ments. Inquiry enables human beings to suspend the ongoing process of
18. Charles Peirce, The Scientific Attitude and Fallibilism in THE PHILOSOPHICAL
WRITINGS OF PEIRCE, supra note 16, at 42-60, 58.
19. See JOHN DEWEY, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge
and Action (1929), in 4 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953 1 (Jo Ann Boydston
ed., 1981).
20. DEWEY, supra note 10, at 156.
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responding reflexively or habitually to stimuli arising from interactions
between the organism and the environment. Response is arrested in or-
der to survey a problematic situation faced by the individual or the group,
and to form a plan of action for satisfactory resolution of the problem. In
other words, we can stop and think. Intelligent inquiry mediates human
responses to the challenges of living. In so doing, it frees human beings
from reliance on instinct and fixed routines; it enhances the power to
achieve desired results.
Inquiry is contextually situated; it is activated by, and responsive to,
what Dewey called a "problematic situation."'" When things are going
smoothly, in accord with well-established habits, there is no need for an
intelligent organism to think. But, when faced with situations that arouse
perplexity and doubt, we are prompted to stop and think about what is
happening in order to plan our response. Recognition of a problem-
that something is wrong-gives rise to intelligent thought. For Dewey,
the scope of inquiry ranges from the common sense problem-solving of
everyday life, to professional work, and to experimental and theoretical
science. Thus, inquiry serves as both a practical means of adaptation and
a tool for generating and validating theoretical knowledge.
Once initiated, inquiry normally proceeds by means of a number of
logical steps. In How We Think, Dewey describes these steps as follows:
"(i) a felt difficulty; (ii) its location and definition; (iii) suggestion of pos-
sible solution; (iv) development by reasoning of the bearings of the sug-
gestion; (v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance
or rejection."22 For example, a patient arrives at a physician's office with
a complaint of persistent pain or discomfort; something is wrong with the
patient; he or she has become ill, and seeks medical attention to deter-
mine what is wrong and how it can be remedied.23 The physician initi-
ates clinical inquiry in an effort to understand the problematic situation
posed by the patient. The physician asks questions of the patient and
examines the patient's body. This effort to diagnose the problem may
include performing laboratory tests, or imaging studies, to elucidate the
pathophysiology underlying the patient's complaint. These diagnostic op-
erations are guided throughout by working hypotheses, drawn from
knowledge of medical science and clinical experience. The physician sys-
21. See generally DEWEY, supra note 15.
22. JOHN DEWEY, How WE THINK 72 (1910).
23. Dewey frequently used the example of a physician diagnosing a patient's medical
problem to demonstrate the character of experimental inquiry. See, e.g., id. at 74. See also
DEWEY, supra note 19, at 139, 165-66.
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tematically tests conjectures about the medical nature of the problem,
which are confirmed or ruled out in the light of the results of diagnostic
procedures and the evolution of the patient's condition.
Having arrived at a diagnosis, or working speculation, about what is
wrong with the patient, the process of inquiry moves to the stage of plan-
ning for the resolution of the problem. Based on the diagnostic possibili-
ties, the physician, ideally in collaboration with the patient, determines
reasonable goals for medical care and considers appropriate interven-
tions. The deliberative process of planning depends on intelligent fore-
sight of the probable consequences of alternative tactics for responding to
the problem. The physician and patient agree to a plan of action, and the
plan is put into operation. Since uncertainty about the diagnosis and the
efficacy of the planned therapy always remains, the plan should be under-
stood as an experiment that needs to be evaluated in terms of how well it
works in practice and in the face of ongoing clinical developments. The
process of inquiry continues until the problematic situation is satisfacto-
rily resolved.
Although inquiry has a trajectory that can be analyzed as proceeding
along functional stages, in reality it is a continuous process without dis-
crete breaks. Earlier phases inform later developments, which in turn
feed back information to clarify and refine hypotheses about the nature
of the initial problem and possible future solutions. The process of in-
quiry is explicated graphically by Tom Burke in his book on Dewey's
logic.24 Burke likens inquiry to the "helical pattern of a corkscrew"25
which he analyzes into two dimensions: "a linear component and a circu-
lar component."26 The linear thrust of the corkscrew represents the tele-
ological movement of inquiry from a problematic situation to a
satisfactory resolution, following the steps illustrated above. Within this
forward movement of inquiry, participants engage in continuing cycles of
forming and testing hypotheses aimed at figuring out what is going on,
deciding what to do, intervening experimentally, and evaluating the re-
sults. This in turn may lead to reappraisal of the problem and a new cycle
of diagnosis, planning, and intervention.
Burke's analogy of the corkscrew is apt: the helical pattern fits the
linear but cyclic process of inquiry. This well-designed tool symbolizes
the instrumental functioning of inquiry as the logical method of intelli-
24. TOM BURKE, DEWEY'S NEW LOGIC: A REPLY TO RUSSELL (1994).
25. Id. at 158.
26. Id.
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gent thought and action. Dewey's conception of inquiry, best exemplified
in scientific method, integrates theory and practice. Reflective thinking,
oriented in terms of established theory, develops hypotheses and designs
experiments to test them. The experimental phase of scientific investiga-
tion constitutes intelligent practice guided by theory. As the result of
carefully designed experimentation, theory. is refined and corrected.
Thinking and intervention into the world-theory and practice-interact
and become mutually reinforcing in the progressive process of inquiry.
By scientific "method" Dewey did not mean an algorithmic process
consisting of rules for discovering "Truth," for understanding reality, or
for determining right from wrong. Rather, "method" consists of logical
patterns of inquiry that promote successful problem solving. The former
view treats method as the logical guide in the quest for certainty, while
the latter treats method functionally and pragmatically.27 The "method"
of inquiry is not mechanical; there are no general recipes for problem
solving in any domain. Careful attention to the contextual details of spe-
cific situations is required in all phases of inquiry. Imagination is needed
to devise plans for interventions to resolve the problems that give rise to
inquiry. Dewey often described the process of intelligent action as
"creative."
IV. DEWEY'S MORAL PHILOSOPHY
Dewey argued that the logic of inquiry, operative in the problem-solv-
ing of daily living, professions, and science, should apply also to morality.
Dewey diagnosed prevailing moral thinking as mired in a classical,
prescientific world-view in which absolutist and dogmatic theory is di-
vorced from practice. Unexamined prejudice and a priori legislation con-
tinue to reign in the moral domain. Dewey's primary philosophical
problem concerned the gap, or cultural lag, between the scientific way of
knowing, which has transformed the material dimensions of modern life,
and the prescientific status of morality. He endeavored to reconstruct
moral thinking, and its application to social policy, in the light of his the-
ory of experimental inquiry.
There was no moral system at work in Dewey's ethical thought. He did
not view the task of moral philosophy as developing a theory that formu-
27. See RICHARD RORTY, Pragmatism Without Method, in 1 OBJECTIVITY, RELATIV-
ISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 63-77 (1991) (Rorty's critique of the scientific
method and his endorsement of "pragmatism without method" appears to be directed to
this rationalistic conception of method.).
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lates and justifies basic or supreme principles of morality. Instead,
Dewey's moral philosophy encompassed two related components: (1) a
naturalistic theory of valuation, including the validation of moral judg-
ments, based on his logic of inquiry; and (2) a pragmatic conception of
moral principles as hypothetical tools or guides in the process of ethical
inquiry.
A. Moral Valuation
Dewey's empirical and naturalistic theory of valuation has affinities
with the major thinkers in the utilitarian tradition including David Hume,
Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill. Dewey, however, criticized his
naturalistic predecessors for treating valuation, the source of moral
knowledge, as deriving from the passive satisfaction of desire. This posi-
tion parallels Dewey's critique of the classical empiricism espoused by
these thinkers, who understood perception, the source of empirical
knowledge, as the passive processing of sense-data.2 8 According to
Dewey, we gain knowledge of fact and value experimentally, by intelli-
gent intervention in the world. Dewey argued that the empirical theory
of values advanced by these thinkers needs to be reconstructed in con-
formity with the logic of experimental inquiry.
The difference between Mill and Dewey on the theory of valuation is
instructive. Dewey agreed with Mill that values must be understood ex-
perientially in terms of the satisfaction of desires. In a famous passage of
his work, Utilitarianism, Mill declared that the grounds for judging that an
object is desirable are similar to the grounds for judging that an object is
visible: "The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is
that people actually see it .... In like manner, I apprehend, the sole
evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people
do actually desire it."'29  Dewey criticized Mill for failing to make clear
that "desirable" means what ought to be desired; whereas the visible con-
cerns what is capable of being seen. Dewey posed the problem of valua-
tion in the following question: How can we make the transition logically
from de facto desiring to de jure judgments of what is desirable? Dewey
attempted his most systematic answer to this problem in a chapter of The
Quest for Certainty entitled "The Construction of Good."3
28. JOHN DEWEY, Changed Conceptions of Experience and Reason, in RECONSTRUC-
TION IN PHILOSOPHY 77, 84 (1948).
29. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 32 (1971).
30. See DEWEY, supra note 19.
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The title of this chapter is significant. The good, or value, for Dewey is
not simply to be passively experienced. Knowledge of value must be con-
structed in the process of inquiry, which Dewey calls "valuation," just as
knowledge of nature is constructed by scientific investigation. "The fact
that something is desired only raises the question of its desirability; it
does not settle it."'" Valuation is governed by the logic of inquiry. What
satisfies our desires becomes a value only so far as it subsequently is
found to be satisfactory as the result of methodical inquiry. For example,
to many people smoking cigarettes is satisfying. Medical science, how-
ever, has demonstrated that it contributes to morbidity and mortality.
Therefore, although cigarette smoking may be desired and satisfying, it is
not desirable or satisfactory. Indeed, the alteration of habits by many
Americans, in the wake of scientific investigation and dissemination of
information concerning the ill effects of smoking, illustrates the power of
inquiry as instrumental in transforming the conditions of living.
Valuation, like factual knowledge, involves a claim that is verified or
falsified in the future as the result Of inquiry. This status of making a
claim about future satisfactions makes value judgments sources of relia-
ble guidance and regulation of conduct. The desirable is to be desired; it
is satisfactory because, and insofar as, it proves satisfying. Reflective
judgment, based on the method of experimental inquiry, links the desired
and satisfying to the desirable and the satisfactory. Dewey did not
equate value judgments and factual judgments; however, consistent with
his philosophical opposition to dualistic thinking, he did not understand
the distinction between facts and values as forming a strict logical or
ontological dichotomy. Experimental inquiry bridges the gap between
fact and value.
The evaluation of medical treatments in clinical trials exemplifies
Dewey's theory of valuation. The fact that a drug or procedure is ac-
cepted by clinicians as effective for the treatment of patients with a cer-
tain condition does not count as adequate proof of its medical value. The
perceived efficacy may be due to the placebo effect of a medical interven-
tion, expected to be therapeutic, rather than its distinctive characteristics
of the treatment. Randomized clinical trials are considered the "gold
standard" of medical valuation; they seek to demonstrate that an experi-
mental treatment, that is desired and thought to be effective, will prove
clinically satisfactory and thus be desirable. A treatment becomes vali-
dated in the context of carefully controlled experimentation that com-
31. Id. at 208.
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pares the results of administering the treatment to a suitable placebo, or
an already validated standard treatment, to randomly selected groups of
patients. Although the opportunities for scientifically rigorous valuation
in human affairs are limited, an indefinitely broad field of operation for
the logic of pragmatic valuation based on empirical observation remains.
This valuation involves framing value hypotheses, planning experimental
interventions, and testing how they work in practice.
Dewey argued that the type of thinking characteristic of science is ap-
plicable in ethics as a method of determining and validating moral judg-
ments and resolving moral problems. Our claim that an object is good is
tested by intelligently directed conduct. Values are determined, or con-
structed, by a process of inquiry yielding reliable, but not certain, results.
Peirce's fallibilism applies to the domain of values and moral judgments,
as well as to the world of facts. Our current valuations should be seen as
provisional and open to revision in the light of future experience.
Dewey's emphasis on applying the scientific method of experimental
inquiry to the resolution of moral problems may give the impression that
his approach to ethics is one of impersonal calculation of consequences,
without any role for emotions in moral valuation and deliberation. This is
far from the truth. Emotional responses often indicate whether some-
thing is morally improper. Thus, they function as indications that a prob-
lematic situation warranting ethical inquiry exists. Like Hume, Dewey
considered the emotive disposition of sympathy as a necessary condition
of the moral life. Dewey observed that: "It is sympathy which saves con-
sideration of consequences from degenerating into mere calculation, by
rendering vivid the interests of others."32 Dewey rejected the dichotomy
between cognition and emotion, that has characterized mainstream ethi-
cal theory since the time of Kant: "Emotional reactions form the chief
materials of our knowledge of ourselves and others. ' 33 In the pragmatic
approach to ethical inquiry, emotions offer a rich source of moral insight
that needs to be combined with empirical observation and logical reason-
ing in order to anticipate and evaluate the consequences of action and to
plan creative solutions to moral problems.34
32. JOHN DEWEY, THEORY OF THE MORAL LIFE 130 (1980).
33. Id. at 129.
34. JOHN DEWEY, Theory of Valuation (1939), in 13 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER
WoRKs 1938-1939 249 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1991).
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B. The Pragmatic Conception of Principles
Dewey developed a pragmatic conception of moral principles as a
guide for moral deliberation in the process of ethical inquiry. As a spe-
cies of practical deliberation, moral deliberation takes place in the con-
text of inquiries responsive to problematic situations. Ethical inquiry is
instrumental to the mutual adaptation of human agents in social environ-
ments; it is directed to problem solving in social contexts in which associ-
ated agents are concerned about evaluating conduct as good or right.
Within inquiry, moral rules and principles function logically as hypothe-
ses, as presumptive guides to conduct in the situation.35 Principles play
an important role both in the diagnostic and intervention planning stages
of inquiry. They shed light on what is occurring morally in a problematic
situation, aid in suggesting possible courses of conduct, and operate as
constraining factors in deciding what is best to do. From this perspective,
rules and principles are not absolutely decisive or final; they have the
logical status of working hypotheses for the satisfactory resolution of
morally problematic situations. In the process of ethical inquiry and ef-
forts to resolve moral problems, we clarify, test,. and revise our moral
rules and principles.
According to Dewey, "life is a moving affair in which old moral truth
ceases to apply."36 Thus, principles should no longer be seen as fixed and
immutable. Instead, they should be understood as hypothetical guides
constructed for regulating conduct in various situations which need to be
reconstructed when the conditions regulating conduct change signifi-
cantly. To take an example from bioethics, the moral rule that physicians
have a duty to preserve life has been modified now that techniques of
life-sustaining treatment can prolong the process of dying or maintain life
in states of intolerably poor quality. Based on developments in the law
and morality, it is considered ethically permissible to forego such treat-
ment, and thus hasten death, if the burdens are considered to outweigh
the benefits from the patient's perspective.37
Dewey criticized the traditional insistence on fixed moral laws as a ver-
sion of the quest for certainty. It shields morality from criticism and re-
form. Just as the modern scientific view of laws of nature, is that they
have the status of hypotheses to be confirmed, modified, or refuted by
35. JOHN DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 238, 239 (1944).
36. Id.
37. ToM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
196-206, 211-219 (4th ed., 1994).
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experimental inquiry, so moral principles ought to be regarded as hypo-
thetical. "A moral law, like a law in physics, is not something to swear by
and stick to at all hazards; it is a formula of the way to respond when
specified conditions present themselves. Its soundness and pertinence
are tested by what happens when it is acted upon."38 When experimental
inquiry is endorsed and practiced in the moral life, belief in fixed moral
laws will be surrendered. It is critical to stress that Dewey did not suggest
that in applying scientific method to ethics, we need to wipe the moral
slate clean. Moral rules and principles embedded in our social institu-
tions have survived the test of enduring experience in human adaptive
conduct. Reconstruction of morality builds on a foundation of prior con-
struction. Traditional moral rules and principles continue to function as
resources for ethical inquiry to the extent that they provide satisfactory
guidance in resolving morally problematic situations.
Dewey's pragmatic conception of principles conflicts with the main-
stream of moral philosophy from Immanuel Kant to the present. Kant
argued that to be moral is to do one's duty for duty's sake. Moral rules
are absolutely binding; they have the status of strict laws which we are
bound to respect. They are categorical rather than hypothetical. Kant
contends that this conception of absolutely binding moral rules is given in
the common moral consciousness. 39 Does it make sense to think of moral
rules as hypotheses? Consider the ten moral rules propounded and de-
fended by Bernard Gert in his book Morality."° Are rules such as "Don't
lie," "Don't kill," "Don't cheat," and "Keep your promises," hypothetical
guides, or are they moral laws binding conduct? Furthermore, if one
takes a stand on principle, stakes one's character, or perhaps one's life, on
a matter of principle, how can such a stand be taken on a mere hypothe-
sis or tool?
This objection from traditional morality we do not regard as posing a
serious problem for Dewey's moral philosophy. For Dewey, principles
function as hypotheses in the process of inquiry. It is necessary to distin-
guish between situations in which there is no doubt about what ought to
be done morally, and morally uncertain situations that call for inquiry to
38. JOHN DEWEY, The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and
Action (1929), in 4 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953 222 (Jo Ann Boydston
ed., 1981).
39. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (H.J. Paton
trans., 1964).
40. BERNARD GERT, MORALITY: A NEW JUSTIFICATION OF THE MORAL RULES
(1988).
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determine what should be done. When it is known, or claimed to be
known, what should be done, then the rule or principle that directs and
justifies conduct is not entertained as a hypothesis. Rather, it stipulates
what should be definitely done. Principles function as hypothetical
guides in ethical inquiry when the point of inquiring is to judge what is
right and good to do in a particular problematic situation. For example,
when the course of action chosen might stake one cherished principle
against another. In the face of problematic situations, it cannot be pre-
sumed in advance that a given moral rule or principle should guide con-
duct. The directive force of the rule, or principle, that makes it applicable
and determinative for the situation under investigation is the very ques-
tion at issue. The nature of the situation needs to be surveyed; all the
relevant moral considerations bearing on it should be brought to light and
evaluated. The inquiry should focus on the probable consequences of fol-
lowing a given rule or principle in the situation. The relevance and scope
of a rule or principle, and its weight in comparison with competing moral
considerations, must critically be assessed. Once it has been decided that
a rule or principle should govern conduct in a problematic situation, then
that decision is binding.
Dewey's moral philosophy is opposed to the idea that ethical theory
can or ought to take the form of a rigorous decision procedure-a
method for deducing correct moral judgments applicable to moral
problems. As indicated above, the relevance and weight of moral consid-
erations to resolving a problem of conduct cannot be determined in ad-
vance of inquiry. The moral life involves choosing the better course of
action in complex, particular situations. Fixed rules do not provide relia-
ble and satisfactory guidance. At any given time morality, like science, is
not final, but subject to development. The quest for certainty in ethics
produces or reinforces dogmatism, absolutism, antipathy to social reform,
and lack of due concern for the possibly adverse consequences of adher-
ing to fixed moral laws. Dewey argued that we need a continuous pro-
cess of ethical inquiry, involving critical thinking, empirical research, and
experimentation, to discover and reconstruct the moral knowledge instru-
mental to solving the moral problems of modern life.
V. DEMOCRACY AS A WAY OF LIFE
Dewey's social philosophy and theory of education center around the
fundamental ideal of democracy. Dewey focused on democracy as a
broad, inclusive moral ideal-as a pluralistic way of life, not just as a
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mechanism of government.41 Institutions and social relations should be
characterized by cooperation, discussion, consultation, and participation.
"The keynote of democracy as a way of life may be expressed ... as the
necessity for the participation of every mature human being in formation
of the values that regulate the living of men together., 42 For Dewey,
democracy is an ideal for social life. He in okes the traditional ideals of
liberty, equality, and fraternity as constitutive of, and mutually implicated
in, democracy as a way of associated life:
Fraternity is another name for the consciously appreciated
goods which accrue from an association in which all share, and
which give direction to the conduct of each. Liberty is that se-
cure release and fulfillment .of personal potentialities which take
place only in rich and manifold association with others: the
power to be an individualized self making a distinctive contribu-
tion and enjoying in its own way the fruits of association. Equal-
ity denotes the unhampered share which each individual
member of the community has in the consequences of associated
action.43
Commitment to the ideal of democracy as a way of life means that the
burden of proof is on those who wish to defend undemocratic, authorita-
rian institutions and social relations involving adults. In group activities,
such as the military, a ship at sea, team sports, that require precise coordi-
nation and discipline, a hierarchy of power and subordination is necessary
and appropriate. Also, democracy may not be appropriate for institu-
tions and social relations involving young children and cognitively im-
paired adults who are not in a position to exercise responsible self-
direction and participate as moral agents in decision making.
Is democracy as a way of life relevant to thinking about the moral di-
mension of the relationship between physician, and the competent, adult
patient? Dewey lived before the advent of the bioethics movement, with
its critique of medical paternalism. Yet Dewey's analysis of the problems
posed by social relationships involving control and subordination applies
aptly to the traditional model of the physician-patient relationship:
The very fact of exclusion from participation is a subtle form of
suppression. It gives individuals no opportunity to reflect and
decide upon what is good for them. Others who are supposed to
41. See JOHN DEWEY, Creative Democracy-The Task Before Us, in JOHN DEWEY:
THE POLITICAL WRITINGS 240 (Debra Morris & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993).
42. JOHN DEWEY, Democracy and Educational Administration, in JOHN DEWEY,
PRO3LEMS OF MEN 57; 58 (1946).
43. JOHN DEWEY, TiH PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS 150 (1954).
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be wiser and who in any case have more power decide the ques-
tion for them and also decide the methods and means by which
subjects may arrive at the enjoyment of what is good for them.
This form of coercion and suppression is more subtle and more
effective than is overt intimidation and restraint. When it is ha-
bitual and embodied in social institutions, it seems the normal
and natural state of affairs."
Traditional medical paternalism and more subtle forms of physician
dominance and patient compliance, operating in contemporary clinical
practice, make it seem normal and natural for patients to adopt passive,
subordinate roles in relationships with physicians. But commitment to
democracy as a way of life calls this into question. Is the patient so inca-
pacitated by illness as to be incapable of participating in planning for
medical care? Are patients so ignorant or lacking in intelligence that
they are unable, with the help of physician communication, to understand
their medical condition and assess the risks' and probable benefits of al-
ternative courses of treatment? Is trustful submission necessary for
healing?
We contend that the model of shared decision-making developed by
Jay Katz, endorsed by the President's Commission, and recently recon-
structed by Howard Brody in a focus on power in medicine and the role
of primary care, agrees with Dewey's ideal of democracy as a way of
lifeY This democratic model contrasts with both traditional medical pa-
ternalism, in which the physician rules the clinical realm, and the auton-
omy model of consumer sovereignty, in which the physician is an expert
technician available to inform and to do the bidding of the patient. Cur-
rent practice reflects an unstable hybrid of the traditional and autonomy
models that is fraught with inherent tensions. Medical paternalism vio-
lates the principle of respect for the patient as a person. Consumer sover-
eignty in medicine, governed by autonomy as the preeminent principle, is
incompatible with a therapeutic relationship and does not do justice to
the professional integrity of physicians. Instead of allocating decision-
making sovereignty to the physician or the patient, the democratic model
prescribes a shared process of discussion, negotiation, compromise, and
consensus. In contested cases it may become necessary to determine who
44. DEWEY, supra note 41, at 58-59.
45. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 85 (1984); See 1 PRESI-
DENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. AND BIOMED. AND BE-
HAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS (1982); HOWARD BRODY, THE
HEALER'S POWER X-Xi (1992).
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decides; however, this is required only when collaboration breaks down
without the prospect of repair. Within the democratic model, the focus is
on how the parties to the clinical encounter can work together to arrive at
a mutually satisfactory plan for the care of the patient.
Any workable model of the physician-patient relationship must accom-
modate the obvious and inherent inequalities in the roles of physician and
patient. The patient is sick, vulnerable, and in need of help; the physician
is a professional who professes the knowledge, skill, dedication, and trust-
worthiness to help the patient recover health, preserve life, and relieve
suffering. In spite of these inequalities in existential situation, knowledge,
power, and authority, the ideal of democracy as a way of life is relevant to
medicine. Democracy rejects authoritarian hierarchy, operating by com-
mand or control, and obedience or submission. It does not reject author-
ity of expertise or presuppose full equality and mutuality. Just as Dewey
advocated democratization of education without undermining the author-
ity and guidance of teachers, so the democratic model of medicine does
not prescribe elimination of inequalities in knowledge and role in the
physician-patient relationship.
The bioethics movement, with its successful challenge to the traditional
paternalism of physicians, has contributed to the democratization of
medicine. It now seems quaint to speak of "doctors' orders." Yet the still
prevalent language of physician management and patient compliance sug-
gests lingering elements of a relationship of dominance and submission,
rather than a fully realized collaborative partnership in healing and pro-
moting health. Democratization of the clinician-patient relationship re-
quires a much deeper transformation than adherence to the legal doctrine
of informed consent and recognition of the patient's right to refuse treat-
ment. Democracy in the clinic means that clinicians should strive to fa-
cilitate positive participation by educating patients about their conditions,
inviting conversation aimed at a shared process of setting goals, and de-
liberating about alternative approaches to treatment and care. Clinicians
must share power with patients and family members by subordinating the
technical aspects of medicine, over which they maintain control, to the
ethical aspects of determining, through dialogue and negotiation, what is
good for patients.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR METHOD IN CLINICAL ETHICS
The dominant paradigm of bioethics, known as "principlism," has gen-
erally adopted the stance of applied ethics: the application of general
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principles, articulated by ethical theory, to moral problems in health care.
By focusing ethical reflection on determining and justifying what is the
right thing to do in the face of isolated moral quandaries in medical care,
this approach has tended to detach moral judgment from the context of
clinical practice-the ongoing process of interaction centered on the care
of the patient. Abstract ethical analysis concentrating on general princi-
ples often does not offer useful guidance to clinicians struggling with con-
crete problems in the care of patients that pose moral issues.
Principles of Biomedical Ethics,46 now in its fourth edition, is the lead-
ing text in the field of bioethics, offering an excellent resource for teach-
ers of bioethics by providing careful analyses of moral concepts relevant
to health care and by exhibiting in detail the significance of basic moral
principles. However, it fails to supply a workable method for clinicians
and clinical ethicists to analyze and resolve moral problems in the care of
patients. Instead, the text provides an elaborate theory of justification for
the application of general principles that is removed from the process of
clinical decision making. In the third edition of their text, Beauchamp
and Childress state: "We believe one of the major defects in contempo-
rary theory in biomedical ethics is its distance from clinical practice ....
But this defect cannot be corrected here."47 Although they omit this
statement from the fourth edition, the problem remains.
A major consequence of the principlism paradigm is that ethical and
clinical thinking are divorced. For example, the opening paragraph of a
recent article on the care of terminally ill patients reflects this separation
of the ethical and the clinical:
How should the clinician respond when terminally ill patients
express distress over a prolonged death or inquire about acceler-
ating death? How should we answer patients and family mem-
bers who ask or even demand that death be hastened? In the
medical literature, euthanasia and assisted suicide are primarily
treated as ethical issues, but ethical principles offer limited gui-
dance for the clinical tasks of caring for these patients. More-
over, we find that when requests for euthanasia and assisted
suicides are framed primarily as ethical matters, key clinical is-
sues in the evaluation of such patients may be missed.48
46. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 37.
47. TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHics
21 (3d ed. 1989).
48. Susan D. Block & J. Andrew Billings, Patient Requests to Hasten Death, 159
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2039, 2039 (1994).
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The separation of clinical and ethical thinking constitutes a central
challenge for the discipline of clinical ethics, which stands for integrating
ethics into clinical practice. To bridge the gap between ethical and
clinical thinking, the prevailing approaches of both bioethics and clinical
problem-solving need to be reconstructed. Ethical analysis must be re-
sponsive to the concrete contexts of clinical reality, within which moral
problems in the care of patients arise and are resolved. Clinical thinking
must include ethical reflection, and clinical practice must be open to re-
form in the light of ethical critique.
In recent years, casuistry, a case-based method of moral reasoning, has
reemerged as an alternative to the abstract, theory-driven application of
principles.49 The emphasis on concrete details of cases, analogical rea-
soning, appeal to paradigm cases, and the moral discernment that guides
particular judgments is salutary for bioethics. There is no fundamental
incompatibility, however, between principlism and casuistry, and when
deployed in practice, these approaches tend to converge.5" On one hand,
because cases do not speak morally for themselves, casuists must invoke
general moral norms in interpreting and analyzing cases.51 On the other
hand, the application of a theory of general bioethical principles to spe-
cific cases calls for a process of specification and balancing that involves
attentiveness to circumstances and context.52 The convergence between
principlism and casuistry is perhaps best illustrated in Baruch Brody's
Life and Death Decision Making, which applies a pluralistic theory con-
sisting of a diverse variety of general "ethical appeals" to forty challeng-
ing cases.53
At a deeper level, principlism and casuistry share a common model of
moral problem solving, which we call the "judgment model." In the judg-
ment model, the facts of a case are given, and a moral dilemma or quan-
dary is posed. After the ethical issues at stake in the case are identified,
the task for ethical thinking is to invoke general principles, or to reason
by analogy and appeal to paradigm cases. In either approach, the aim is
to reach and justify a judgment about what is the right or wrong thing to
49. ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY'
OF MORAL REASONING (1988).
50. Tom L. Beauchamp, Principlism and its Alleged Competitors, 5 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 181, 191 (1995).
51. See John D. Arras, Getting Down to Cases: The Revival of Casuistry in Bioethics,
16 J. MED. & PHIL. 29-51 (1991).
52. See BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 47 (arguing that specifying and balanc-
ing principles are both required in order to achieve resolution of moral problems).
53. See generally BARUCH A. BRODY, LIFE AND DEATH DECISION MAKING (1988).
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do in the situation. The focus in the judgment model is on making and
defending an ethically correct decision about the moral dilemma from a
detached perspective of ethical judgment.
In contrast, clinical pragmatism, inspired by Dewey's philosophy,
adopts a "process model" of moral problem solving. In this model, the
facts of the case unfold and are assessed in a dynamic process of inquiry
aimed at providing a satisfactory resolution to a morally problematic situ-
ation involving the care of a specific patient. The task is to develop and
negotiate an intelligent and ethically appropriate plan of action for the
engaged participants. The process model of moral problem solving is in-
herently dynamic; it concerns interactions between clinicians and patients
(or surrogates) in a relational process with a trajectory extending into the
future. Moral valuation is combined with clinical assessment and prob-
lem solving. Accordingly, moral judgments are oriented and adapted to
the ongoing project of planning for the care of patients. This model at-
tends to the interpersonal process of moral problem solving, as well as to
the substantive decisions about the proper action to take.
Understanding this method of ethical inquiry as clinical and scientific,
does not indicate that the definition and resolution of moral problems are
merely matters of technical expertise. Satisfactory moral problem solving
in the care of patients requires empathic understanding, dialogue, and
negotiation between professionals and lay persons. Similarly, by adopt-
ing a process model of moral problem solving, clinical pragmatism does
not endorse, as normative, prevailing patterns of clinical practice. The
Deweyan ideal of democracy as a way of life operates as a guide to ethical
critique and reform of clinical practice.
Following Dewey's theory of inquiry, moral problem solving in clinical
practice proceeds by a number of logically connected steps. To demon-
strate and evaluate this method requires detailed examination of cases
that pose moral problems.54 We Confine our attention here to a sche-
matic outline of the method of clinical pragmatism.
Case analysis begins with assessing the patient's situation: i.e., deter-
mining what is going on morally. The ethically relevant considerations at
54. See, e.g., Joseph J. Fins et al., Clinical Pragmatism: A Method of Moral Problem
Solving for Clinical Practice (case analysis submitted for publication, on file with author)
(providing a detailed case analysis using the method of clinical pragmatism); Fins &
Bacchetta, supra note 8 (providing a foundation upon which the authors build their ap-
proach); John C. Fletcher et al., A Case Method in Planning for the Care of Patients, in
INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL ETHics 19-34 (John C. Fletcher et al. eds., 1995) (providing
additional foundation upon which the authors built their approach). • -
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stake in the evolution of the case must be identified and critically evalu-
ated. The assessment includes the following: relevant medical facts; the
life situation of the patient; the patient's capacity to make health care
decisions; the beliefs, values, preferences, and needs of the patient; the
impact of the care of the patient on family members and others intimately
concerned with the patient; institutional arrangements that may be ob-
structing shared decision making; the perspectives of involved clinicians;
and relevant moral, legal, and institutional norms.
The next step in problem solving is to determine the appropriate goals
of medical care, taking account of the existential and clinical dimensions
of the situation under inquiry. Many moral problems in the care of pa-
tients arise from a truncated process of setting goals. For example, in the
hospital setting, clinicians may presume that the appropriate goal is to
intervene aggressively to seek a cure, or to prolong life. Focusing on par-
ticular organ systems rather than the patient as a whole, and operating in
conformity with the often implicit imperative to treat whatever is treata-
ble, clinicians may concentrate inquiry on the technical aspects of medical
decision making without paying due attention to the goals of treatment
and care.55 Alternatively, clinicians who seek to limit aggressive inter-
vention for patients who are terminally ill and incapacitated may press
family members to agree to a plan of forgoing resuscitation in the event
of a cardiac arrest before the surrogate decision makers have been pre-
pared adequately for the imminent death of the patient. To the extent
possible and desired, patients or surrogate decision makers should col-
laborate in the task of setting and negotiating goals. This requires a cli-
mate of open, patient, and empathic communication to facilitate
adequate understanding of the patient's condition, and to prepare the pa-
tient or surrogate for meaningful participation in the medical decision-
making process.
Deliberating about how to resolve the problem centers on arriving at a
clinically and ethically appropriate plan. Alternative courses of action
are considered and assessed in the light of their anticipated consequences.
Both clinical and ethical considerations are integrated in this process of
deliberation. Appeals to clinical judgments, of what is medically indi-
cated, and to moral judgments, that invoke principles, operate in tandem
as hypothetical directives that guide the process of problem solving, not
55. HOWARD BRODY, THE HEALER'S POWER, 150-53 (1992).
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as trumps that dictate decisions.56 Deliberation leads to a decision about
what to do, understood as an experimental intervention aimed at achiev-
ing a satisfactory resolution of the problem. The plan is implemented,
results are evaluated, and modifications made as needed.
Clinical pragmatism understands moral problem solving as proceeding
according to the same method of inquiry as clinical problem solving. The
focus of clinical inquiry is widened to include ethical reflection, analysis,
and deliberation in order to solve moral problems in the care of patients.
Clinical pragmatism also reconstructs ethical thinking in the process of
integrating it with clinical problem solving. In this process model, moral
judgment, like clinical judgment, centers on the details of concrete prob-
lematic situations in the context of planning for the care of patients. The
resources of ordinary morality and ethical theory-moral intuitions and
sentiments, principles, rules of obligation, rights, and virtues-are treated
hypothetically as tools to guide problem solving. By integrating ethical
and clinical thinking, the method of clinical pragmatism is serviceable to
clinicians and ethicists.
There are some affinities and significant differences between clinical
pragmatism and the approach taken in Clinical Ethics, a text which makes
an admirable effort to integrate ethics into clinical practice.57 It is meant
to be useful to clinicians at the bedside, as indicated by the subtitle, "A
Practical Approach to Ethical Decisions in Clinical Medicine." Unfortu-
nately, it serves more in providing physicians with handy answers in-
tended to be authoritative for resolving ethical dilemmas rather than
formulating or illustrating a method of ethical problem solving. The four
orienting topics of this approach, indications for medical intervention,
preferences of patients, quality of life, and socioeconomic factors, are in-
dispensable for ethical inquiry in clinical medicine. Nonetheless, by sepa-
rating the text into chapters organized around each of these topics, the
authors do not clarify how these and other ethical considerations work
together in the concrete process of inquiry and problem solving. In addi-
tion, the authors' "practical approach" addresses moral problems within
prevailing standards of clinical practice. Although this approach recog-
nizes the principle of respect for patients as persons, the text's model of
the physician-patient relationship retains features of physician dominance
and patient management. The physician is responsible for treatment
56. Franklin G. Miller, The Concept of Medically Indicated Treatment, 18 J. MED. &
PHIL. 91, 95, 98 (1993).
57. See ALBERT R. JONSEN ET AL., CLINICAL ETHICS: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO
ETHICAL DECISIONS IN CLINICAL MEDICINE (2d ed. 1986).
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planning and decision making, subject to the acceptance or veto of the
competent patient. Clinical Ethics concentrates on the responsibility of
physicians for providing ethically appropriate care of patients and resolv-
ing moral problems that arise in clinical practice. The roles of nurses,
social workers, and other clinical professionals are not addressed. Re-
form of clinical practice in the light of a democratic ideal of participation,
dialogue, and negotiation is not articulated as a goal in this approach to
clinical ethics.
In introducing clinical pragmatism, via an overview of the thought of
John Dewey, we have concentrated on the pragmatic method of inquiry
and the democratic model of relationships in health care. These two com-
ponents should be understood as working together. Ethical inquiry, be-
cause it concerns shared problems in social contexts, is a cooperative,
communal activity. The good constructed by means of inquiry is an inter-
personal or social good. The values of those concerned with shared
problems need to be accounted for and appraised in inquiry. Construc-
tion of a shared, common good-a good that a number of concerned indi-
viduals associated together join in constructing-links ethical inquiry with
democracy as an ideal. The democratic model provides the ideal context
within which inquiry and planning for the ethically appropriate and good
care of patients takes place. Therefore, inquiry concerning what is good
for patients should, to the extent possible and desired, be done with the
participation of patients. A process of communicative interaction and ne-
gotiation characterizes both the pragmatic method of inquiry and the
democratic model. In the democratic model, clinicians and patients col-
laborate through shared inquiry and problem-solving and ongoing dia-
logue to construct good clinical practice.
Clinical pragmatism also has implications for relationships between
health care providers. In particular, the way in which physicians, nurses,
and other health professionals interact merits examination and recon-
struction in the light of both the pragmatic method of inquiry and the
ideal of democracy as a way of life. A focal point of analysis and reform
is the collaboration between physicians and their clinical colleagues in
ethical deliberations concerning planning for the care of patients and in
implementing and evaluating clinical interventions. Clinical pragmatism
presents a perspective on clinical ethics applicable to all clinicians, with
respect to both professional activities and interprofessional cooperation.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Clinical pragmatism aims to integrate clinical and ethical thinking by
means of an approach to moral problem solving drawn from a Deweyan
conception of scientific method. Rather than a method for bioethics ex-
perts asked to render judgments on perplexing moral quandaries, clinical
pragmatism is a method for engaging practitioners, patients, surrogates,
and ethicists in the task of promoting and implementing good clinical
practice. In other words, clinical pragmatism adopts a process model of
moral problem solving, instead of the judgment model characteristic of
principlism and casuistry. Clinical pragmatism guides moral problem
solving within the dynamic interactive processes of relationships among
clinicians, and between clinicians and patients. It offers an ethical ap-
proach to assessing, negotiating, and implementing decisions connected
with the context of ongoing planning for the care of patients. Further-
more, clinical pragmatism is oriented in terms of a democratic ideal. It
urges both the integration of ethical and clinical problem solving, and the
reform of clinical practice in the light of the ideal of democracy as a way
of life.
In other essays we intend to illustrate concretely the merits of the prag-
matic method of inquiry for resolving moral problems in the care of pa-
tients and to flesh out the democratic model. Following Dewey's
commitment to integrating theory and practice and social reconstruction,
we plan to address strategies for implementating the method and the
model. Dewey saw education as a major instrument of social reform. We
will examine how clinical pragmatism can be taught to medical and nurs-
ing students and to clinicians with the aim of integrating ethics into
clinical practice. In addition, the relationship of clinical pragmatism to
other types of ethical theory, including utilitarianism, situation ethics, cas-
uistry, and "principle-based common morality theory, 58 deserves de-
tailed examination. Accordingly, we have issued a significant promissory
note, which we hope to redeem, with suitable pragmatic "cash value" in
the future.
58. See generally BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESs, supra note 37, at 100 (establishing "prin-
ciple-based, common-morality theories" as the label used to describe the authors' ap-
proach to ethical theory and comparing principle based theories to other theories).
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